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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the relationship between agency
assertiveness and moderation of budget requests within the
Department of Agriculture. It covers the budgetary roles and
strategies used in the DOA, Office of Management and Budget,
and Congressional appropriation committees. The database used
was supplied by the DOA and contains agency initial budget
requests and appropriation data from 1980 to 1990.
The analysis compares agency budget request increments to
the actual increments appropriated, as a percentage of a
common base. The study found that during periods of fiscal
restraint the most assertive agencies were the most
successful. However, with the support of clientele groups and
legislative branch members, agencies requesting moderate
increases as well as decreases experienced significant growth
in their funding levels and restoral of budget cuts made
earlier.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
This thesis examines the relationship between agency
assertiveness and moderation of budget requests within the
Department of Agriculture (DOA) for fiscal years 1980-1990. The
actual behavior, role, and strategies of individual agencies,
departments and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is also
explored. The relationship between DOA agencies and their budget
reviewers will be examined to assess what impact, if any, they have
on an agency's request.
The thesis poses two related arguments: 1) agencies that are
assertive in their requests -- within a certain range -- will
experience budget growth even during periods of fiscal restraint;
and 2) with the support of clientele groups and legislative branch
members, agencies requesting moderate increases as well as
decreases, will also experience budget growth and the restoral of
budget cuts during contraction periods.
There are many political and socioeconomic variables that
determine the degree of budget success for the DOA. This thesis
hypothesizes that growth in agency budgets is not only related to
the degree of assertiveness but also to the support and confidence
agencies have managed to develop among government officials.
The study begins with the work that Lance T. LeLoup and
William B. Moreland conducted utilizing DOA data between 1946 and
1
1971. The study compares budget request increments to the actual
increments appropriated, as a percentage of a common base. This
thesis is not intended to explain or predict an annual level of DOA
expenditures, but rather an annual increment. Success is measured
not in terms of what percentage of the budget request is
appropriated, but in terms of what percentage increment is
appropriated over the base.
Using data supplied by the DOA from 1977 to 1990 the
strategies, and roles used by the agencies, department, OMB, and
Congress were examined. The data is analyzed to identify
consistent patterns of behavior in the strategies and roles of the
reviewing authorities (Department, OMB, and Congress). Although
past budget data is available for fiscal years 1977 to 1979 the
study will focus on the period from 1980 to 1990.
After analyzing the data supplied by the DOA, an attempt to
explain agency assertiveness within the DOA is made by answering
the following questions: What patterns appear in the DOA budget
requests over the decade of the 1980's? How do these findings
compare to the Department of Navy (DON), Organization and
Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N) pattern? And finally, are there
differences between programs in the DOA?
B. BUDGET TRENDS IN THE 1980's
Overall, the 1980's have witnessed a sharp reduction in the
rate of growth of Federal spending. Real outlays in 1990 are
expected to be 26 percent above their 1980 level; through 1988, the
2
cumulative growth rate has also been 26 percent. This is a much
smaller increase than in any previous decade since the 1920s, when
the Budget Act of 1920 established the Bureau of the Budget and the
modern budgeting process. Before then, the role of the Federal
Government and its budgeting system were so different that
meaningful comparisons are not possible.(Ref.1]
Because of the slowdown in the rate of growth of federal
budgets, outlays will account for a slightly smaller share of GNP
in 1990 than they did in 1980; 21.0 percent vs 22.1 percent. This
will be the first decline over a full decade since the
1920s.(Ref.1]
It is worth emphasizing that the 1980s have seen slower growth
and restructuring of Federal Government spending, but not an actual
reduction in expenditures. Even after adjusting for inflation, the
level of federal spending will be higher in 1990 than it was in
1980.
An increasingly popular classification system for Federal
outlays is the division into national defense, discretionary
programs, and entitlements and other mandatory programs. During
this decade, outlays for these broad budget categories have shifted
in very different ways.
- Defense spending has been increased above the levels of the
late 1970s, but still constitutes a smaller share of the
budget and of GNP than at anytime during the 1950s and
1960s; note figure 1.1.
- Domestic discretionary programs have been cut back in real
3
terms; however, not all discretionary programs have been
scaled back. Important priorities have been maintained and
expanded.
- Entitlements and other mandatory programs have continued to
grow in real terms, albeit more slowly than in the past, and
now constitute about the same share as they did 15 years
ago.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show graphical comparisons of the programs
within the DOA that were analyzed in this thesis and Department of
Defense (DOD) annual budget authority and the percent change in
budget authority from 1977 to 199g.
Overall, the DOA has experienced a decline in budget authority
throughout the 1980s as shown in Fig. 1.1. However, Fig. 1.2 shows
a different pattern. The percent change in DOA budget authority
shows a significant amount of turbulent change whereas the DOD
tends to change in smooth increments/decrements.
Chapter II provides additional background on budget strategies
and roles of budget participants. Chapter III presents the data
and the study conducted to make comparisons of various budgeting
behaviors. Chapter IV concludes the thesis with an assessment of
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II. BACKGROUND
In this chapter the traditional budget pattern is described.
Much of this pattern is owed to the work of Aaron Wildavsky for his
picture of how administrators arrive at a composite estimate of how
much to ask for and how the guardians, Department, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress review budgets. Although
this portrayal dates from the early 1950's and 1960's, it is still
true today for discretionary accounts in budget systems. This
chapter describes Wildavsky's picture of the incremental budget
process.
A. ROLES, STRATEGIES, AND TRADITIONAL BUDGETING
Wildavsky's seminal work in agency budget strategies confirmed
the close relationships between agency, clientele, and legislative
committees. Success in the budget game is not based on how good
budget estimates are but how good a politician the administrator
can be. "Being a good politician . . . requires essentially three
things: cultivation of an active clientele, the development of
confidence among other government officials, and skill in following
strategies that exploit one's opportunities" (Ref.2:p.8].
For the most part agency cultivation of a clientele is no
problem. Agencies are adept at serving those who are in a position
to help them. Doing so allows them to focus more on critical
7
programs with all else being secondary or automatic. Agencies
strive to organize clientele groups in every facet of the budgetary
process, priming them to engage in approved projects (Ref.
3:p.102]. Using informal relationships with legislators, agencies
can "plant" favorable questions, or they can comply with request
for information from hostile participants by deluging them with
paper. Sympathetic participants can be given information that will
help the agency [Ref.4:p.9]. In order to secure substantial funds
from Congress for domestic purposes, it is necessary to develop
fairly wide interest in the program [Ref.3:p.102].
In the uncertain atmosphere of the budgeting process, the
participants find it beneficial to trust one another. Wildavsky
views this as a key element for agencies because they perceive that
other participants in the process can hurt them if the agencies
prove untrustworthy. Gaining the confidence of others depends on
informal contact between agency personnel and legislative committee
members and staff. Informal contact, especially with members of
the legislature, furthers agency success and strengthens the
relationships [Ref.4:p.8].
Agency administrators play the role of advocate for their
programs and are vitally concerned with the programs they can
develop, operate, and expand [Ref.4:p.9]. There is a related
reason for the agency advocacy role. Thomas Anton suggests that
administrators seek larger budgets every year. Asking for even
more than the administrator expects to receive shows that the
administrators are aggressive and competent. By asking for more
8
than they expect to receive, agency administrators allow central
budget officers to play their role of cutting agency requests and
deciding how much to recommend [Ref.5:p.9].
One of the toughest problems facing agencies today is how much
should they request from OMB and Congress? Their strategy is to
ask for an increase, but a modest increase. They expect to be cut
back and take this into account in their calculations, keeping in
mind too large a request might result in severe cutbacks. OMB is
expected to cut, partly because of its interest in the President's
program, and partly because it believes that agencies are likely to
"pad". Congress, through the appropriations committees and
subcommittees, makes incremental cuts in agency requests because it
expects the agencies to request more than they need. (Ref.6:p.62].
B. INCREMENTALISM
Budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive. The beginning of wisdom about an agency budget is that
it is almost never actively reviewed as a whole every year in the sense of reconsidering the value of
ail existing programs as compared to alL possible alternatives. Instead, it is based on last year's
budget with special attention given to a narrow range of increases or decreases. (Ref. 7 :p. 62 ]
Incrementalism explains the strategies and behavior of
participants as well as the observed patterns of budgetary
stability. The incremental process of mutual adjustment is built
around the reinforcing roles and expectations of the participants
as agencies attempt to establish a base and then gradually expand
it [Ref.6:p.62J.
Incrementalism suggests that the dominant agency decision rule
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in calculating its budget request is to take a fixed percentage
increase of the previous year's appropriation. The dominant
congressional decision rule in voting appropriations is to make a
fixed percentage cut in the agency's final request [Ref.6:p.63].
These two simple calculations summarize the process and the results
of incrementalism: the "striking regularities of the budgetary
process" that are indicative of the stable decision rules employed
by the participants [Ref.8:p.529]. This according to Wildavsky is
responsible for the stability examined in the appropriation process
[Ref.3:p.86].
C. EQUATIONS FOR AGENCY DECISION RULES
This section will present three models developed by Davis,
Dempster, and Wildavsky to describe how agencies prepared their
budget request [Ref.8:p.33]. The first will calculate agency
requests as a function of the previous year's appropriation. The
second calculates requests as a function of the previous
appropriation as well as a function of the differences between the
agency request and appropriation in the previous year. The third
calculates the request as a function of the previous year's
request. Agencies usually request a percentage (greater than 100
per cent) of the previous year's appropriation. However the
percentage is not fixed: in the event of favorable circumstances,
the request is a larger percentage of the previous year's
appropriation than would be otherwise; similarly, the percentage
might be reduced in the event of unfavorable circumstances.
10
An agency's budget request is represented by taking the sum of the
average percentages of the previous year's appropriation plus the
increment or decrement due to the favorable or unfavorable
circumstances. Thus
Xt = BO Yt-1 + Et (2-1)
Xt = budget request of agency
30 = slope of budget request line
Yt-l = previous year's appropriation
Et = random variable (increment or decrement)
is an equation representing this type of behavior.
An agency may wish to smooth out its stream of appropriations
by taking into account the difference between its request and
appropriation for the previous year. If an unusually large cut
took place in the previous year's request, then the agency can
submit a "padded" estimate to make up for the loss in expected
funds; an unusual increase is followed by a reduced estimate to
avoid unspent appropriations. This behavior may be represented by
an equation or decision rule where
xt = BIyt-1 + B2 (Yt-1 - xt-1) + Et (2-2)
t is a stochastic disturbance, which plays the role described for
the random variable in equation 2-1. B1 represents the mean
percentage of the previous year's request, and 32 represents the
11
mean percentage of the difference between the previous year's
appropriation and request (Yt-1 + xt-1)"
Finally, an agency, convinced of the worth of its programs,
may decide to make request without regard to previous congressional
action. This strategy appeals especially when Congress has a great
deal of confidence in the agency that it tends to give an
appropriation which is almost identical to the request. Aside from
special circumstances represented by stochastic disturbances, the
agency's request in any given year tends to be approximately a
fixed percentage of its request for the previous year. This
behavior may be represented by
Xt = B3xt-1 + Et (2-3)
where Et is a stochastic disturbance and 83 is the average
percentage.
Although there are other models that could represent the
actual behavior of the combined budgeting decisions, these three
equations, according to Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky represent
the agency-OMB budgeting behavior better than all other models
analyzed.
D. EQUATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL DECISION RULES
Congress uses various strategies in determining appropriations
for different agencies. Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky have also
developed three equations to show congressional behavior. The
12
first model calculates congressional appropriations as a function
of the agency's request (through OMB) to Congress. The second
calculates appropriations as a function of the deviation from the
usual relationship between Congress and the agency in the previous
year. The third model calculates appropriations as a function of
that segment of the agency's request which is not part of its
appropriation or request for the previous year. Again random
variables are included to take account of special circumstances.
If Congress believes that an agency's request, after passing
through the hands of the OMB, is a relatively stable index of funds
needed by the agency to carry out its programs, Congress responds
by appropriating a relatively fixed percentage of the agency's
request. This behavior may be represented by
Yt = Y0xt + I)t (2-4)
where y0 represents the fixed percentage and it represents the
stochastic disturbance.
Although Congress usually grants an agency a fixed percentage
of its request, this request sometimes represents an extension of
the agency's programs above (or below) the size desired by
Congress. Its possible this can occur when the agency and the OMB
follow presidential aims that differ from those of Congress, or
when Congress suspects the agency of "padding" the current year's
request. In such a situation Congress usually appropriates a sum
different from the usual percentage. If y represents the mean of
13
the usual percentages, then this behavior can be represented by the
equation
Yt = YtXt + t
where is a stochastic disturbance representing that part of the
appropriations attributable to the special circumstances that cause
Congress to deviate from a relatively fixed percentage. Therefore,
when agency aims and congressional desires differ markedly (so that
Congress may be said to depart from its usual rule), the stochastic
disturbance takes on an unusually large positive or negative value.
In order to distinguish this situation from the previous one, more
must be specified about the stochastic disturbance Et. In a year
following one in which agency aims and congressional desires
markedly differed, the agency will make a request closer to
congressional desires, or Congress will shift its desires closer to
those of the agency (or the president), or both will occur. In the
year after a deviation, the assumption is that Congress will make
allowances to normalize the situation. This behavior can be
represented by an equation where it is a random variable and the
symbol yt stands for the stochastic disturbance in the previous
year (yt-.) as well as the new stochastic disturbance for the year
involved. Thus
14
Yt = YtXt + Yt~t-1 + t (2-5)
Finally, if Congress knows the decision rule of a given
agency, provided it is represented by one of the equations
discussed above, then it can take into account the padding or
gaming behavior of the agency. Thus
Yt = Y3Xt + Y4'Xt + t (2-6)
is the third congressional rule, where 't is a dummy variable which
in year t represents:
tt if Equation 2-1 obtains,
IB2(Yt- - xt-11 + Et if Equation 2-2 obtains,
Et if Equation 2-3 obtains
depending upon which of the decision equations above represents the
agency behavior.
E. TRADITIONAL BUDGETING
Traditional budgeting has been changing through the gradual
acceptance of reforms rather than dramatic breakthroughs. Many
aspects of traditional budgeting have survived because of the
complexity and uncertainty of the budgetary process. Agencies
decide how much to ask for, OMB decides how much to recommend, and
the legislative appropriations committees have the final say on how
much to give. Often these participants agree on ways to simplify
the process to make it manageable. [Ref.7:p.6]
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Wildavsky has suggested two concepts-base and fair share- that
have enabled participants to handle budgeting in the real world:
The base is the general expectation among the participants that programs wit be carried on at ctose
to the going Level of expenditures but it does not necessarily include aLL activities. Having a project
inctuded in the agency's base thus means estabtishing the expectation that the expenditure wil
continue, that it is accepted as part of what wiLt be done, and, therefore,that it wiLL not normaLLy
be subjected to intensive scrutiny. [Ref.7:p.17]
The base represents those programs that participants agree are
legitimate and should not be questioned, except when times are
tough. The base may be defined as the "current estimate (existing
spending level of an agency), or next year's anticipated cost of
maintaining programs at current levels of service (particularly
important in inflationary times) [Ref.3:p.83].
Budget participants expect their programs to be maintained
close to the current funding levels. This expectation was
evaluated using a linear model developed by James N. Danziger.
"Operationalizin,% the base as the proportion of total expenditure
allocated to Serv'cei, this model assumes that the change pattern
will maintain an allocation as a constant percentage of total
expenditure" [Ref.9:p.133]. To use this model, last year's budget
proportion is multiplied by the current year's budget to predict a
claimant's funding level.
Base Allot = B(Base Allot.1) + a (2-7)
Base Allot = this year's percent budget share
B = slope of the line
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Base Allot.i = last year's percent budget share
a = random variable
Fair share on the other hand differs from the base. According
to Wildavsky, "Fair share means not only the base an agency has
established but also the expectation that it will receive some
proportion of funds, if any, which are to be increased over or
decreased below the base of the various governmental agencies"
[Ref.7:p.7]. All the participants (agencies, departments, OMB, and
the appropriation committees) in the budgetary process agree that
budgeting should be incremental; that is, changes in agency budgets
should be relatively small and in proportion to overall budget
changes.
To determine if budget participants retain a fair share of the
overall budget, another model developed by Danziger is used. "This
model (fair share) is based on a constant percentage of change in
total expenditures" [Ref.9:p.133]. It will predict this year's
change in budget allocation by multiplying the agency's previous
proportion of the budget by the total change in expenditures.
A Allot Agencyi = B(Allot._ A TE) + a (2-8)
A Allot Agencyi = change in the agency's budget level
B = slope of the budget line
Allot.I = last year's budget proportion
A TE = change in total expenditures
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F. LELOUP/NORELAND STUDY ON BUDGETING IN THE DOA
There are several models used by governmental reviewing
authorities in accessing all the determinants involved in cutting
budgets. A study of the budgets submitted by agencies within the
Department of Agriculture, from 1946 through 1971 and the
subsequent changes made by the department head, OMB, and Congress
was undertaken by Lance T. LeLoup and William B. Moreland.
Their conclusions showed significant variations in the budgets
submitted and a wide range of strategies used by the agencies
within the DOA. Incrementalism posited the existence of a dominant
agency strategy of "moderation"; asking for an increase, but not
too large an increase as well as a budget cutting guardianship role
for the reviewing bodies (Ref.lo:p.180]. Viewed as a whole their
study suggest that budgets change in moderate increments and are
more stable than the component stages.
They agreed that assertive or aggressive action on behalf of
the agency was a prerequisite to budget expansion. Assertive or
aggressive action was defined as the tendency for agencies to
pursue an active strategy of expansion in their programs and
funding [Ref.10:p.182]. In their study on the (DOA) aggressiveness
was defined as a requested increase of ten percent or more over the
previous year's budget.
They found that agencies requesting moderate increases wound
up with a lesser share than those asking for large increases. It
was conceivable that those asking for large increases averaged an
overall increase in their appropriations. However, the larger the
18
increase requested the more it was cut, but the proportion of cuts
are not made in direct relation to the requested increase or
decrease. Tables 2-1 and 2-2, indicate the results of their
research.
They found that OMB, in its consistent across the board cuts
is the main obstacle to budget expansion. The department(DOA) made
cuts in the most assertive categories but minimized cuts in cases
where agencies requested a decrease. However, the department made
small incremental increases in the 10-25 per cent category whereas
OMB eliminated nearly all of the requested increases in this
category. Clearly the role of the department is one of "balancing
the extremes". The role of OMB, seems to be that of reducing an
agency's request. Even more significant is the finding that
moderation in request confers no advantages in terms of support
from OMB [Ref.10:p.186]. Those who asked for a decrease were also
cut by OMB.
Compared to the department and OMB, the overall changes made
by Congress were small. Large requests were cut more severely but
resulted in greater absolute growth. Severe cuts made by OMB in
agencies requesting a decrease were restored by Congress
[Ref.9:p.189]. The greater absolute growth seen in the most
assertive categories is attributed to the actions by those agencies
who sought wide support throughout Congress.
In conclusion, LeLoup and Moreland suggest that the "normal"
strategy of moderation posited by the incremental theorist is more
myth than reality. The strategy of moderation may be desirable for
19
TABLE 2-1




Change in Agency Avg % Avg % Avg % Change in
Request from # of Change by Change by Change by Agency
Previous Budget Cases Dept OMB Congress Approp
Req Decr 60 25.5% - 6.5% 2.4% -21.0%
Req Incr 0-9.9% 99 - 2.0% - 3.0% - 0.3% 0%
10-24.9% 121 1.3% - 8.0% - 0.5- 1.3%
25-49.9% 103 -13.0% -11.0% - 0.7% 4.6%
50-99.9% 79 -16.5% -14.4% - 1.3% 17.0%
Greater than 100% 36 -20.2% -16.2% -10.5% 130.0%
Avg for Agencies 498 - 4.0% - 9.0% - 2.0% 11.0%
TABLE 2-7
REQUEST PATTERNS BY CATEGORIES OF ASSERTIVENESS
Average Average Average
Agency Agency Department OMB
Assertiveness Increase Increase Increase Average
Categories Requested Requested Requested Growth N
Decrease -19.4% > -14.9% > -22.3% > -21.1% (60)
0-9.9% 5.0% > 3.5% > 0.3% >- .02% (99)
10-25% 16.1% > 17.5* > 1.9% > 1.3% (121)
25-50% 36.2% > 18.9% > 6.0% > 4.6% (103)
50-100% 68.0% > 40.2% > 18.9% > 17.0% (79)




agencies seeking certainty, stability, and high support for their
initial request, but it will not lead to agency growth and may in
fact lead to agency decline. To obtain substantial,
"nonincremental" increases in programs and budgets, an agency must
attain a position of political strength (with support inside and
outside government) to justify a large increase. "Don't come in
too high" is poor advice for an agency wishing to receive more
money; "come in as high as you can justify" would appear to be
better advice based on the results of this study [Ref.10:p.191].
In the next chapter we turn to a study of current patterns in
DOA to see how those patterns hold up.
21
III. DATABASE AND STUDY
A. THE DATABASE
The data in this thesis was provided by the DOA. Data for the
agency, department, OMB requests and final congressional action
taken on DOA agencies from 1980-1990 is used in this analysis.
This includes 220 cases of request-appropriation data for the 20
agencies examined. The agencies in the DOA are not necessarily
typical of all federal agencies and the findings in this analysis
are not necessarily generalizable for all agencies. The data
contains the initial budget requests prepared by the agencies and
the changes made by the reviewing bodies (department, OMB, and
congressional appropriation committees).
B. DATA ANALYSIS
To assess the real patterns of budgeting within the DOA I will
focus on the incremental assertions concerning the dominant
strategy of moderation. Figure 3.1 identifies the DOA agencies
analyzed in this study. Table 3-1 shows the amounts of the
agency's budgets. This study analyzes:
1. What patterns of aggressive/assertive behavior appear in the
DOA budget requests over the decade of the 1980's?
2. How does the DOA budgeting trends of the 80's compare with
the Navy O&MN trends?
3. Are there differences between programs in the DOA?
1. Agency Aggressive/Assertive Behavior
Mentioned earlier, assertiveness is defined as the
tendency for an agency to pursue an active strategy leading to
22
expansion and growth in its programs and level of funding.
Assertiveness is determined by the amount of increase in this
year's budget request over the prior year budget. By examining the
agencies requested budgets for the fiscal years 1980-1990, and
comparing the amount of each to the prior years budget, the
requested budget increases are measured. The assertiveness of the
agencies over this eleven year period can be seen in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2 shows the distribution of the agency request to the
department as a percentage change from the previous year's
appropriation. Surprisingly, more agencies (35 percent) requested
cuts from their budgets than those requesting a moderate increase.
35 percent requested a budget cut. Thirty three percent requested
a budget increase between 0 and 9.9 percent and 32 percent
requested an increase greater than 10 percent. The LeLoup/Moreland
study from 1946-1971 showed 20 percent of the agencies requested a
0-9.9 percent increase and 68 percent sought more than 10 percent.
This study was conducted during periods of budget expansion, during
which aggressive action was encouraged. However, the current data
(1980-1990) conducted during periods of fiscal restraint still show
signs of aggressiveness by DOA agencies in their request for
funding.
To examine agency assertiveness and legislative branch
support more closely as well as the success achieved by the
assertive agencies over the eleven year period, the growth or
shrinkage of each category of budget request is compared to the





Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Child Nutrition Program
Cooperative State Research Service
Departmental Administration
Extension Service
Federal Grain Inspection Service
Food Donations/Distribution Program
Food Safety and Inspection Service
Food Stamp Program
Foreign Agricultural Services
Office of the General Counsel
Office of the Inspector General
Office of the Secretary
Rural Water and Disposal Grant
Soil Conservation
* Special Milk Program
* Supplemental Food Program
World Agricultural Outlook Board
Figure 3.1 DOA Agencies
*Denotes "sticky expenditure" program
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TABLE 3-1
TOTAL BUDGET LEVELS BY AGENCIES
(in thousands of dollars)
Agency FY80 81 82 83 84
1 58,764 55,173 64,435 31,094 30,376
2 415,870 426,089 526,619 544,047 531,110
3 295,159 311,330 344,269 252,491 236,673
4 1,463,751 1,830,923 2,053,990 1,027,322 488,617
5 236,005 214,586 274,427 299,613 293,725
6 27,609 22,641 21,563 16,848 20,378
7 327,616 327,031 376,994 381,293 378,145
8 24,665 27,052 35,306 4,898 6,861
9 87,600 129,450 144,420 171,960 154,136
10 315,469 302,240 342,163 317,027 337,196
11 7,047,250 9,729,870 12,887,150 9,523,092 10,958,252
12 64,909 69,604 78,257 95,996 86,544
13 12,071 12,531 13,748 14,999 14,626
14 37,813 39,858 51,967 53,717 45,049
15 5,181 5,249 5,508 6,157 5,045
16 400,000 500,000 500,000 250,000 160,500
17 958,132 614,550 690,447 749,841 622,683
18 145,000 166,200 124,800 124,800 11,920
19 694,600 924,540 1,110,570 902,200 1,092,600
20 1,062 2,110 1,568 1,741 1,555
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TABLE 3-1 con't
TOTAL BUDGET LEVELS BY AGENCIES
(in thousands of dollars)
Agency FY85 86 87 88 89
1 31,193 30,735 31,073 35,647 33,764
2 528,716 532,760 545,536 596,514 604,164
3 265,263 264,880 337,886 355,708 343,255
4 826,477 656,543 297,246 1,106,999 531,159
5 323,396 361,476 457,689 435,136 547,795
6 22,415 21,349 19,246 23,327 27,929
7 356,039 335,907 389,954 393,003 391,116
8 6,942 7,094 7,000 7,610 8,876
9 53,536 59,931 183,642 195,092 217,943
10 369,669 381,740 380,976 410,458 426,282
11 10,460,926 11,756,074 11,711,915 11,962,550 12,330,705
12 86,727 85,704 87,000 91,375 90,823
13 16,916 17,834 16,891 19,600 23,342
14 46,472 47,092 47,000 52,252 52,514
15 5,788 5,824 5,505 6,465 6,240
16 113,000 125,000 119,000 0 109,395
17 701,501 670,261 621,104 638,437 681,317
18 17,600 11,500 14,094 33,974 34,540
19 1,441,140 1,540,479 1,676,102 1,732,478 1,975,514
20 1,680 1,736 1,823 1,942 2,053
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TABLE 3-1 con't
TOTAL BUDGET LEVELS BY AGENCIES
























AGENCY ASSERTIVENESS: PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN AGENCY REQUEST
TO DOA FROM PREVIOUS YEAR'S APPROPRIATION
Request Increase
Request 0% - 5% - 10% - 15% - 20% & Total
Decrease 4.9% 9.9% 14.9% 19.9% Above
77 41 32 24 11 35 220
this comparison and the changes in agency request made by the
reviewing bodies.
The results of this comparison show that agencies
originally requesting an increase in funding of 15-20 percent had
an average appropriation growth of only 6.3 percent. Agencies
requesting between 10 and 15 percent on average saw their budgets
grow by 15.8 percent. The substantial appropriation increases
appeared in the most assertive category-- these agencies requested
more than 20 percent of their previous appropriation and had an
average growth of 37.5 percent. The most assertive category
represents 35 cases out of the 220 cases examined and constitute
only 16 percent of all agencies included in the study. This
category alone received the largest cuts in its budget request,
followed by those requesting a 5-9.9 percent increase. Those
agencies (33 per cent) requesting a 0-10 percent increase are said
to be moderate in their requests, whereas those (32 per cent)
requesting greater than 10 per cent were considered to be assertive
in their budget request.
Table 3-3 also shows a significant number of decreases











CHANGES IN AGENCY REQUESTS MADE BY REVIEWING BODIES
Avg%
Change in Agency Avg% Avg% Avg% Change in
Request from Number Change Change Change Agency
Previous Budget of Cases Dept OMB Congress Approp
Request Decrease 77 -32.4 -63.4 236.9 -10.2
Increase 0-4.9% 41 -15.7 -21.6 8.1 22.2
Increase 5-9 9% 32 -14.2 - 9.4 - 7.5 15.7
Increase 10-14.9% 24 5.6 -11.9 20.9 15.8
Increase 15-19.9% 11 - 5.9 13.6 19.6 6.3
Increase > 20% 35 45.2 14.5 -59.4 37.5
the moderate and assertive categories individually, the number of
decreases requested were greater than the number of increases
requested in each category. The one area of consistent agreement
is that those agencies who request a budget cut, will be cut deeper
than requested. Consistent with this agreement and the findings in
these 77 cases, these agencies received the most severe cuts by the
department and OMB. However, consistent with the results of the
previous study, Congress not only restored most of the severe cuts
made by OMB, but added tremendous amounts to those agencies
requesting a decrease.
Inconsistent with previous studies agencies requesting
moderate increases less than 10 percent experienced substantial
budget increases slightly greater than the most assertive category
in their final appropriation. The previous study (1946-1971)
indicated this same category of agencies requesting moderate
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increases of less than 10 percent saw their budgets cut below the
previous year budget level [Ref.10:p.186]. However, this study
parallels the findings of the previous study in that those agencies
requesting increases greater than 10 percent received substantial
budget increases.
At this point, some general observations on budgetary
roles and strategies can be proposed.
a. Agencies
Agencies do not pursue a unitary strategy of
moderation in the budgetary process; initial requests vary from
severe cuts to significant increases in previous budget levels.
Variations in patterns of executive branch support suggest that in
some cases, assertive behavior is manifested throughout the
process, and agencies attempt to restore cuts made earlier by
appeals to Congress [Ref.10:p.188]. Unlike the previous study all
categories with exception of the most assertive and those agencies
requesting increases between 5 and 9.9 percent received
overwhelming support by Congress. This may indicate that a
majority of the agencies took an active role in organizing
clientele groups and developing confidence among other government
officials, particularly legislative committee members and staff.
b. Departments
The Department of Agriculture in its budget cutting
role did "balance the extremes" as was done in the previous study.
However, its behavior differed from the past in that it acted as
surrogate advocate in the most assertive cases and stuck to its
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role as budget cutting guardian in the non-assertive cases. The
DOA was also consistent in passing along substantial request
increases greater than 10 percent.
c. 0MB
The Office of Management and Budget did not appear
to be the main obstacle to agency budget growth. However, the
notion that OMB is characterized by across-the-board cuts did not
prove so in this study. Surprisingly, OMB failed to cut requests
in the most assertive categories and displayed greater variations
in the least assertive categories than the other reviewing bodies
(DOA and Congress).
d. Congress
The actions of Congress differed little from those
of the previous study. Large requests were cut more severely but
resulted in greater absolute growth for the agency. The findings
showed a strong willingness on the part of Congress to restore
severe cuts in requests made by OMB.
2. Assertive Budgeting in the Department of Defense
Previous research by Lieutenant Jack Housley, United
States Navy (1986) on assertive budgeting in the Department of the
Navy; Operations and Maintenance, Navy appropriation found that the
O&M,N budget changed in smooth increments, but major claimants
(agencies) failed to receive changes in proportion to their
previous budget share. However, the most assertive claimants came
away with the bulk of the increases. It was noted that more
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claimants requested a decrease than requested increases greater
than ten percent. These findings parallel those I found in my
study on the DOA and differs significantly from the LeLoup/Moreland
study done on the DOA. In my study 77 agencies requested a
decrease and 70 asked for more than ten percent. Surprisingly,
both DOA studies indicate that agencies are more assertive in their
request for budget increases than the Navy's major claimants.
The reviewing authority of NAVCOMPT in the DON is
equivalent to that of the Department in the DOA. Housley found the
success achieved by assertive claimants was dependent on NAVCOMPT
support and without it their budget request suffered significantly.
NAVCOMPT support for the non assertive claimants was found not to
be as important, for their initial request turned out to be the
strongest determinant of their budget.
His analysis differed with the LeLoup/Moreland study and
my analysis in that, NAVCOMPT did not attempt to "balance the
extremes". It was more likely to increase the requested budget
than decrease it. NAVCOMPT's role focused on the decisions made by
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and evaluated
the claimants requests against those decisions. Whereas in the
LeLoup/Moreland study the Department was more concerned with
"balancing the extremes". The findings in my analysis agree with
those of the LeLoup/Moreland study in that the Department continues
to "balance the extremes". Surprisingly, however, it differed in
its support of the agencies. It behaved like the budget-cutting
guardian in the non assertive cases and acted as "surrogate
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advocate" in the most assertive cases.
Both previous studies show that OMB is the main obstacle
to budget growth and is very mechanical in its cuts.
Interestingly, in my study OMB showed significant support in the
most assertive categories. In the least and non-assertive
categories, OMB appeared to be mechanical in its cuts.
From these studies one can conclude that the most
effective strategy for an agency or claimant is to ask for the
largest increase that can be reasonably justified. In addition,
support of the public, the President and particularly Congress is
essential to justify any large incremental increases in budgets as
was found in my study. Budget reviewing bodies are less willing to
cut funds if they think that the next reviewer will restore the
cuts due to popular or political support for the program. Agencies
with popular or political support of this nature find it easy to
be assertive in their requests and will likely achieve success in
expanding their budgets.
3. Sticky Expenditures
Allen Schick suggest that political constraints on cutting
back and the dulling of the tools available to Congress have
resulted in "sticky expenditures," claims on the budget that
respond only weakly, if at all, to contraction policies. The
concept of "stickiness" has been borrowed from economics, where it
is used to explain why prices are sometimes slow in adjusting to
changing market conditions. "Sticky" is preferred rather than
"inflexible- or "rigid" expenditure because the latter adjective
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suggest that expenditures do not adjust at all. The evidence is
that adjustment does take place, but not as responsively as might
occur if expenditure were less "sticky." Sticky expenditures tend
to rise even when the government attempts to curtail spending.
There are several forms of sticky expenditures, but only one will
be analyzed in this study: entitlement mandating payments to
eligible persons. [Ref.l1:p.124]
To determine if there are real differences in the spending
patterns of agencies governed by entitlement: I will compare the
incremental assertions of this category to those that are
considered non-sticky. The programs that come under this category
are listed in Figure 3.1. Most sticky expenditures are
controllable, but not through appropriations action alone. To
avert the expenditure, the law giving rise to the obligation has to
be repealed. This is why narrowing reconciliation, the principal
tool for controlling sticky expenditure, has been so damaging to
cutback efforts [Ref.ll:p.124].
As a result of past decisions on future budgets, sticky
expenditures tend to drift upward, even in the absence of new
commitments [Ref.1l:p.124]. The distribution of agency requests to
the Department as a percentage change from the previous year's
appropriation is displayed in Table 3-4. Fifty three percent of
the agencies requested an increase greater than 10 percent, and 33
percent requested an increase greater than 20 percent from the
previous year. When compared to the other (non-sticky)
agenciesthey appear to be more assertive in their budget requests.
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TABLE 3-4
STICKY PROGRAMS: PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN AGENCY REQUEST TO DOA
FROM PREVIOUS YEAR'S APPROPRIATION
Request Increase
Request 0% - 5% - 10% - 15% - 20% & Total
Decrease 4.9% 9.9% 14.9% 19.9% Above
16 6 4 9 2 18 55
Table 3-5 will give a better assessment of agency assertiveness and
a more detailed view of the actions of the reviewing bodies.
The actions of the reviewing bodies on those agencies
requesting decreases in funding, surprisingly, resembles those
found in Table 3-3. Congress restored all the cuts made by the
Department and OMB. This indicates these agencies like those in
Table 3-3 may have pursued a political strategy in building support
in and outside of government and cut programs they knew Congress
would ultimately end up restoring. However, its interesting to
note that the overall budget decrease in this category was
extremely low when compared to those in Table 3-3 and the
LeLoup/Moreland study. This suggest Congress is highly reluctant
in cutting entitlement programs mandating payments to individuals.
Those agencies requesting moderate increases of less than
5 percent experienced budget cuts of -1.8 percent. The most
substantial budget increase occurred with the most assertive
category, request greater than 20 percent. There is a difference
in the average change in the budget requests of claimants asking
for less than 10 percent budget increase when compared to claimants
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TABLE 3-5
CHANGES IN AGENCY REQUESTS MADE BY REVIEWING BODIES
(Sticky Programs)
Avg%
Change in Agency Avg% Avg% Avg% Change in
Request from Number Change Change Change Agency
Previous Budget of Cases Dept OMB Congress Approp
Request Decrease 16 - 5.9 -18.3 146.0 - .8
Increase 0-4.9% 6 - .3 - 7.3 1.1 - 1.8
Increase 5-9.9% 4 .1 - 1.4 - 2.8 10.6
Increase 10-14.9% 9 28.7 1.3 -11.8 7.4
Increase 15-19.9% 2 - 4.0 -27.0 66.0 7.7
Increase > 20% 18 - 5.8 -20.8 -26.3 18.4
Consistent with the study of non-sticky programs and the
LeLoup/Moreland study, agencies that requested large increases got
the largest share of budget increases.
The Department somehow continued to maintain stability and
continuity (balance the extremes) for its sticky programs by
cutting the most assertive categories along with those requesting
decreases. OMB appeared to be the main obstacle to budget
expansion with its across the board cuts in all but one category
(10-14.9 percent). Congress showed greater variations than OMB.
Where the Department and OMB made cuts Congress restored those cuts
and in areas where they recommended increases Congress wound up
cutting. However, the most assertive category was cut the most by




The purpose of this thesis was to examine the roles and
strategies used by agencies within the Department of Agriculture in
modifying their budget requests for executive review by the Office
of Management and Budget and final submission to Congress. The
study covers the period from 1980-1990. The different decision
models available to the agencies were highlighted as well as the
decision models available to the reviewing bodies (Department, OMB,
and Congress). Sticky expenditures were also examined to assess
the impact they have on agency requests for funding.
The study found that during periods of fiscal restraint, DOA
agencies requesting moderate increases were just as successful as
those who were assertive in their requests. The study also shows
the strategies used by the agencies, in addition to the incremental
and budget base models, were those of organizing active clientele
groups and seeking widespread support throughout the legislative
branch. This strategy was paramount in the non-assertive and
moderate categories and responsible for the restoral of cuts and
significant budget growth experienced.
The traditional budgeting theory of incrementalism provides
a means for budget participants to agree on ways to simplify the
complexity and uncertainty of the budgeting process to make it more
manageable. Two concepts --fair share and budget base-- suggested
by Wildavsky and Danzinger were described in detail and indicate
how participants may handle budgeting in the real world
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[Ref.12:p.6]. The incremental and budget base models proved to be
very useful and powerful tools in predicting future budgetary
outcomes in previous studies. However, Wildavsky cautions against
using his model to predict outcomes"... because the budget process
is only temporally stable for short periods [Ref.13:p.39). For
example, sticky expenditures tend to drift upward. Much of the
updrift is pronounced in transfer payments that have experienced a
steady rise in the number of participants on an annual basis.
Outlays in the entitlement programs (sticky) examined were driven
upward by cost-of-living adjustments as well as inflationary
pressures.
Traditional budgeting has been changing through the gradual
acceptance of reforms rather than dramatic breakthroughs. Many
aspects of traditional budgeting survive because of the complexity
and uncertainty of the budgetary process. Having a thorough
understanding of all that's involved in the budgetary process, and
a firm knowledge of the review process, agencies can better plan
and gain approval of their budgets.
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